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bstract
The literature on financial development and growth has received a lot of attention over the past two decades. Unlike growth, not much of
onsideration has been given to poverty reduction. Moreover, most of the past studies focus on bank and stock market development. The advent of
icrofinance institutions (MFIs) lets to think about the potential role MFIs can play in a countrywide economy. In this study, we consider to what
xtent banks and MFIs reduce poverty. We apply the instrumental variables approach, namely the fixed-effects two-stage least squares, to a panel
f 71 developing countries over the period 2002–2011. Using credit to GDP as the main financial development indicator, the results indicate that
anks reduce poverty when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio and poverty gap. As for the squared poverty gap, there is no significant
ffect of banks. On the other hand, MFIs do not appear to have any impact on poverty regardless of the measure of poverty employed. These results
mply that while banks have some ability to reduce poverty, MFIs do not, at least at the aggregate level. Our results are robust to the use of assets
o GDP as an alternative measure of financial development. 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
EL classiﬁcation: O11; G21
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have been most prevalent in South Asia, especially compared to
other poor regions such as Africa and Latin America althougheywords: Banks; Microfinance; Poverty; Developing countries
.  Introduction
Numerous studies have considered interactions between
nancial development and economic growth, including the
irection of causality between the two. Some research has also
onsidered poverty and financial development. These studies
nclude Honohan (2004), Beck et al. (2007), Odhiambo (2010),
nd Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011). Studies such as Jalilian
nd Kirkpatrick (2002) consider a “trickle-down” approach.
uilding upon the framework of Beck et al. (2000) and Dollar
nd Kraay (2002), Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) first consider
ow financial development affects economic growth and then
xamine to what extent growth reduces poverty. A common
lement of these studies is that they have considered economy∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 216 397 4970; fax: +1 216 397 1728.
E-mail addresses: fdonouadonsou@jcu.edu (F. Donou-Adonsou),
sylwest@siu.edu (K. Sylwester).
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
t
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2016.06.002
879-9337/© 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Aide measures of financial development, such as money and
uasi money, market capitalization, or private credit in their
mpirical work. Such indicators fail to capture how different
nstitutions within the financial sector influence poverty.
This omission could be especially important when examining
icrofinance institutions (MFIs) since they were promoted for
he specific purpose of providing financial services to the poor,
specially credit, in order to alleviate poverty. Microfinance first
ained prominence during the 1970s with organizations such
s the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the work of advo-
ates like Mohammad Yunus. The scope of MFIs has since
rown manifold. From 2002 to 2011, the gross loan portfolio
f MFIs in developing countries increased by more than 1700%
nd its number of active borrowers increased by 400%.1 MFIshey have grown in these regions as well. They also often serve
1 MIX Market data from www.mixmarket.org.
ll rights reserved.
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marketing information for loans to expand businesses and createF. Donou-Adonsou, K. Sylwester / Revi
ural communities where banks often cannot be found. Although
FIs also make loans from their deposits as do banks, their
nancing can also come from investor borrowing, from equity,
nd from grants. Since they often serve poor communities, loans
o individuals are generally much smaller than typical bank loans
nd often not collateralized. Therefore, given that banks and
FIs serve different clienteles, make different types of loans,
nd are financed from different sources, they capture distinct
spects of financial development and so could have different
mpacts upon poverty alleviation.
The objective of this paper is to compare traditional banks
o microfinance institutions as to what extent each contributes
o poverty reduction. In this sense, we coincide with Jeanneney
nd Kpodar (2011) in that we characterize financial development
s access to financial services in the “banking system” com-
osed of traditional banks and MFIs. Studies such as Khandker
2005) and Mahjabeen (2008) have considered to what extent
icrofinance has lowered poverty at the local level. More
ecent theoretical work (Ahlin and Jiang, 2008; Yusupov, 2012;
uera et al., 2012) has suggested the potential for macroecono-
ic effects of microfinance. For example, Donou-Adonsou and
ylwester (2015) find that microfinance loan growth increases
conomic growth and total factor productivity in developing
ountries. In this paper, we take the potential for MFIs to have
acroeconomic impacts seriously, especially given the rapid
rowth in MFIs, and examine to what extent this rise has been
ble to reduce poverty at a national level. Comparing this effect
o that from traditional banks helps to place any impact in better
ontext as well as to see if MFIs do, indeed, play an enhanced
ole in reducing poverty.
An example of such a comparison comes from Thanvi (2010)
or the Cooch Behar District of West Bengal, India. Thanvi
escribes a shift from banks to MFIs due to the unavailability
in part or total) of loans from banks. For Thanvi, MFIs supple-
ent the role of banks by reaching the unreached. In this way,
ne might infer that MFIs should be able to reduce poverty to a
arger extent than banks. However, Thanvi also documents that
FIs charge higher interest rates. One MFI, Bardhan, charges
n effective rate of 24%, twice that charged by banks. These
igher rates raise questions regarding how effective MFIs are at
educing poverty.
This study employs an instrumental variables approach to a
anel of 71 developing countries over the period 2002–2011.
he results indicate that banks reduce poverty when poverty
s measured by the headcount ratio or the poverty gap but
ot when poverty is measured by the squared poverty gap.
n the other hand, MFIs do not appear to have any impact
n poverty regardless of the measure employed. While the
esults suggest that banks play a role in reducing poverty,
FIs do not appear to have done so, at least at the aggregate
evel.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a more
etailed description of the literature. Section 3 describes the data
nd outlines the methodology. Section 4 presents and explains
he results. In Section 5, we provide a robustness check using
n alternative measure of financial development, and Section 6
ffers concluding discussion.
j
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.  Literature  review
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model where
nancial intermediaries analyze imperfect information and
hannel funds from savers to borrowers. Their model includes a
articipation cost, a lump-sum fee that agents must pay to partic-
pate in the financial sector. This fee effectively keeps the poor
rom taking advantage of opportunities in the financial sector.
ot only would the poor not benefit, but the income distribution
ould even widen between low and high income agents. This
mplication is endorsed by Stiglitz (1993) for whom financial
arket failure is the fundamental cause of poverty in develop-
ng countries. Applying this model to our case, the participation
ee would likely be lower for MFIs and so they would be bet-
er able to obtain credit, invest, and escape poverty. Of course,
hether it is sufficiently low so as to benefit the poor is another
uestion.
Such considerations have not been examined at a macro-
conomic level where, as stated, economy wide measures of
nancial development are used. Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002),
eck et al. (2008), and Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) have
sed the trickle-down approach – an indirect effect of financial
evelopment on poverty reduction through economic growth –
o investigate financial development and poverty reduction in
eveloping countries and find that financial development fosters
rowth which then reduces poverty. For instance, Jalilian and
irkpatrick (2002) argue that by widening financial services
ccess to the poor, their income will grow, which eventually
ill reduce poverty. For example, an insurance service pro-
ided to the poor can better protect them against income shocks.
ther studies have investigated the direct relationship between
nancial development and poverty reduction or the income dis-
ribution. These studies include Honohan (2004), Jalilian and
irkpatrick (2005), Beck et al. (2007), Perez-Moreno (2011),
eanneney and Kpodar (2011), and Sehrawat and Giri (2015)
lthough they differ both in terms of what proxies for finan-
ial development they use as well as in their outcome variable
headcount ratio, poverty gap, Gini coefficient, etc.).
Given the purported role of MFIs in assisting lower income
ouseholds, various studies have focused upon these institutions
nd examined to what extent they can help raise living standards
mong the poor. Several studies have found beneficial effects
pon consumption or income (Khandker, 2005; Kondo et al.,
008; Berhane, 2009; Collins et al., 2009; Imai and Azam, 2011;
erhane and Gardebroek, 2011), housing conditions (Berhane,
009; Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011), village-level wages and
nvestment in agriculture (Kaboski and Towsend, 2012), savings
Kondo et al., 2008; Dupas and Robinson, 2009), and health
nd food security (Stewart et al., 2010). Other studies remain
keptical. For instance, Chowdhury (2009) casts doubt on the
ffectiveness of microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool given
he profit-seeking nature of financial institutions. He argues that
icrofinance, though it provides a safety net and can help smooth
onsumption, needs its borrowers to have business skills andobs. Likewise, Copestake and Williams (2011) argue that MFIs
y themselves cannot bring sustainable growth and reduction in
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overty as obstacles such as selection bias weaken the positive
ffects of MFIs on households’ welfare.
These empirical studies examine the effects of MFIs at the
ocal level, but to what extent might MFIs influence poverty
t the national level? Even if the effects of any one MFI
re only felt locally, countrywide effects could still arise if
FIs were located in many communities as in many develop-
ng countries. Another possibility for macroeconomic effects
ould occur through spillovers, especially if increasing con-
umption or investment spurs additional job creation. Buera
t al. (2012) build an economy-wide model of entrepreneur-
hip wherein MFIs service the poor who cannot borrow in the
traditional” financial sector. They then explore to what extent
FIs influence output, capital, total factor productivity, wages,
nd interest rates, finding in some cases that MFIs not only raise
utput but decrease disparities between rich and poor. Ahlin and
iang (2008) and Yusupov (2012) also find that MFIs promote
evelopment on a wider scale.
.  Data  and  methodology
.1.  Data
Banks are defined as financial institutions that accept deposits
nd make loans. In this study, we consider deposit money banks
ommonly studied in the finance-growth literature. These banks
ccept demand deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits
Beck et al., 2013), and are composed of commercial banks
nd other financial institutions such as thrift institutions and
redit unions. Microfinance, on the other hand, is defined as
nstitutions that primarily provide financial services to the poor.
hey may be compared to credit unions in terms of structure
nd activities. However, microfinance institutions differ from
anks in that they receive most of their funding from exter-
al loans, grants, or investors. They also differ from banks
n that they mostly make small loans called “microcredit”
o the poor. Referring to Microﬁnance  Information  Exchange
MIX), a microfinance institution “can be a nonprofit organi-
ation, regulated financial institution or commercial bank that
rovides microfinance products and services to low-income
lients.” Microfinance data comes from the MFI  Proﬁles  and
eports from MIX. MIX recognizes six legal statuses for
icrofinance institutions: banks, credits/cooperatives, non-bank
nancial institutions, non-governmental organizations, rural
anks, and others. Data regarding traditional banks comes from
eck et al. (2013).
Our main measure capturing the roles of banks and MFIs
re their respective private credit as a percentage of GDP since
oans represent the key financial service offered by most insti-
utions, especially in developing countries. Thus, higher levels
f credit imply higher levels of financial services, and therefore
igher levels of financial intermediation. Looking at Table 1,
ank credit averages 27.34% of GDP whereas that for micro-
nance credit is 1.12%. The reason for this large difference
ies in the difference between the two institutions’ customers.
anks generally fund larger enterprises with much higher lever-
ge abilities, while MFIs fund smaller enterprises with much
{
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ower leverage abilities. Although we focus upon credit, we
ill also consider another financial measure, namely the ratio of
ssets to GDP, as a robustness check. Assets to GDP, contrary to
rivate credit to GDP, include credit to the public sector as well.
ll two financial development variables have been extensively
sed in the literature.2 For each of these variables, we consider
ne measure for banks and another measure for MFIs. Compar-
ng results between the two measures can provide better context
or what extent MFIs influence poverty compared to traditional
anks. Given that banks’ data are deflated, we also deflate the
icrofinance data as described in Beck et al. (2013).3
A weakness of our approach is that loans from what one gen-
rally labels as microcredit – and, hence, – loans from MFIs – are
ombined with loans from traditional banks as MIX relies upon
he characteristics of the borrower to denote a loan as “micro-
redit” and not the lender. This shortcoming is not fatal for our
urposes because we want to examine to what extent finance
irected toward the poor (regardless from what source) lowers
overty.
As for variables capturing the extent of poverty, we consider
he poverty headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and the squared
overty gap. The first two variables come from Poverty  and
quity Database  published by the World Bank and the last
ariable comes from PovcalNet, also published by the World
ank. The World  Development  Indicators  provides data for the
ini coefficient and real GDP per capita ($PPP). In Table 3, we
rovide more details on all these variables.
The data covers 71 developing countries from 2002 to 2011.
he initial year is chosen due to data availability. The summary
tatistics are provided in Table 1, the correlation coefficients in
able 2, and the countries in the sample are listed in appendix.
n important feature of these correlation coefficients is that
he poverty measures are weakly negatively correlated with the
nancial development variables. It is also important to point out
hat the magnitudes of the correlations are higher for the meas-
res of bank activity. One last feature of the correlation table
s the weak negative correlation between banks and MFIs with
espect to their respective credit and assets.
.2.  The  empirical  model  and  methodology
We use the growth-poverty model suggested by Ravallion
1997) and Ravallion and Chen (1997). Adams and Page (2005)
ave used this model to investigate the impact of international
igration and remittances on poverty in developing countries.
e adopt a similar approach that controls for income and its
istribution to investigate the impact of financial development
n poverty. The empirical model is given by:2 See for instance Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2013).
3 Beck et al. (2013) provide the following deflation method:
(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + Ft−1/Pet−1]}/[GDPt/Pat], where F is credit or assets; Pe
s end-of-period CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Poverty headcount at $1.25 a day PPP (%) 324 14.30 18.59 0.00 87.72
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day PPP (%) 324 5.22 8.26 0.00 52.76
Squared poverty gap at $1.25 a day PPP (%) 314 3.67 6.97 0.00 52.76
Per capita GDP ($PPP-constant 2011) 700 6088.77 4794.86 492.61 22,569.81
Gini index 325 42.05 9.71 16.23 67.40
Credit bank (%GDP) 710 27.34 22.51 0.55 121.49
Credit MFI (%GDP) 710 1.12 1.87 0.00 13.70
Asset bank (%GDP) 687 35.24 25.98 0.63 131.49
Asset MFI (%GDP) 709 2.09 4.22 0.00 48.58
Rule of law 620 3.14 1.08 1.00 6.00
Ethnic tensions 620 3.72 1.24 0.00 6.00
Table 2
Correlation coefficients.
Credit bank Asset bank Credit MFI Asset MFI Headcount Pov. gap Sq. pov. gap Gini
index
P.c. GDP Rule of
law
Ethnic
tensions
Credit bank 1
Asset bank 0.93 1.00
Credit MFI −0.03 −0.12 1.00
Asset MFI −0.04 −0.11 0.97 1.00
Headcount −0.10 −0.12 −0.04 −0.08 1.00
Poverty gap −0.10 −0.12 −0.02 −0.05 0.96 1.00
Squared poverty gap −0.23 −0.24 −0.06 −0.06 0.86 0.93 1.00
Gini index 0.08 0.11 0.02 −0.05 0.39 0.43 0.19 1.00
Per capita GDP 0.11 0.19 −0.33 −0.28 −0.52 −0.44 −0.47 −0.15 1.00
Rule of law 0.05 0.02 −0.04 −0.02 −0.14 −0.14 −0.16 −0.67 0.18 1.00
Ethnic tensions 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.23 −0.05 0.08 −0.19 −0.26 1
Table 3
Variable description and source.
Variable Description Source
Poverty headcount Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day 2005 $PPP. It is the percentage of the population living on less
than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices
Poverty and equity database
Poverty gap Poverty gap at $1.25 a day 2005 $PPP. It is the mean shortfall from the poverty line expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line
Poverty and equity database
Squared poverty gap Squared poverty gap at $1.25 a day 2005 $PPP, defined as a % of poverty line. It is an indicator of
poverty severity.
PovcalNet
Per capita GDP PPP (constant 2011 international $) World development indicators
Gini index Measures income inequality. An index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies
perfect inequality
World development indicators
Credit bank Deposit money banks credit, defined as a % of GDP Beck et al. (2013)
Credit MFI Measured by the gross loan portfolio, defined as a % of GDP Market information exchange
Asset bank Deposit money banks assets, defined as a % of GDP Beck et al. (2013)
Asset MFI Defined as a % of GDP Market information exchange
Rule of law Measures law and order tradition of the country. It ranges from 0 (weak tradition) to 6 (strong
tradition)
International country risk guide
Ethnic tensions Measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language
divisions. It ranges from 0 (high tensions) to 6 (minimal tensions)
International country risk guide
N ) to
{ of-pe
w
μ
c
G
mote: We use the deflation method proposed by Beck et al. (2013
(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + Ft−1/Pet−1]}/[GDPt/Pat], where F is credit or assets; Pe is end-
here pov  is the measure of poverty in country i at time t;
 represents the mean per capita income measured by per
apita GDP ($PPP); g is income inequality measured by the
ini coefficient; x  denotes a financial development indicator as
d
a
e deflate MFI credit and assets. The deflation formula is given by
riod CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI.
easured by bank development (bank credit) and microfinance
evelopment (MFI credit); αi denotes country fixed-effects;
nd ε  is the error term. In Eq. (1), the coefficients (βi) are
lasticities.
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Table 4
OLS estimates of the effects of financial development (measured by private credit/GDP) on poverty.
Poverty headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Per capita GDP −1.732*** −2.396*** −1.707*** −2.444*** −2.907*** −2.449*** −2.006*** −1.753** −1.992**
(−4.17) (−4.32) (−3.46) (−6.45) (−5.70) (−5.49) (−3.77) (−2.17) (−2.63)
Gini index 4.593*** 4.516*** 4.581*** 4.245*** 4.098*** 4.247*** 3.374*** 3.444*** 3.366***
(4.24) (3.88) (4.18) (4.87) (4.63) (4.84) (3.60) (3.63) (3.60)
Credit bank −0.531** – −0.529** −0.326* – −0.326* 0.151 – 0.154
(−2.61) (−2.57) (−1.67) (−1.66) (0.61) (0.64)
Credit MFI – −0.026 −0.006 – −0.009 0.001 – 0.010 −0.005
(−0.45) (−0.12) (−0.18) (0.03) (0.09) (−0.04)
Constant 1.157 5.498 0.974 6.787 10.308* 6.827 4.277 2.301 4.170
(0.19) (0.8) (0.16) (1.42) (1.75) (1.32) (0.72) (0.28) (0.56)
Within R2 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.22 0.22 0.22
# of countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 66 66 66
# of obs. 309 309 309 299 299 299 270 270 270
Note: All variables are expressed in logs. The estimation is based on the fixed-effects method for which we report the within R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses
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tre based on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and *
s reduced in the table because of missing values for poverty variables (see sum
In Eq. (1), and consistent with Ravallion (1997), per capita
ncome or economic growth is expected to lower poverty while
ncome inequality is expected to have a positive effect on
overty. As for the financial development indicator, which is
he addition to this model, its relationship with poverty is not
lear-cut in the literature. Nevertheless, following Jalilian and
irkpatrick (2002), Beck et al. (2008), and Jeanneney and
podar (2011), who find that financial development fosters
rowth which then reduces poverty, we expect financial indi-
ators to reduce poverty.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, one sometimes takes first
ifferences as in Ravallion and Chen (1997) since differences
re less persistent over time than are levels. However, we refrain
rom doing so as needing two observations for poverty or the
ini coefficient would greatly reduce the sample size. Despite
his concern, we first estimate equation (1) using the fixed-effects
echnique (OLS), which assumes that our independent variables
re exogenous. To then address endogeneity concerns, we also
se instruments and estimate via two-stage least squares (2SLS).
he first instrument we use is ethnic tensions.4 Beck et al. (2003)
ave used this variable and find significant negative correlation
etween ethnic fractionalization and private credit. This corre-
ation could be explained by the fact that greater ethnic diversity
mplies the adoption of policies and institutions geared toward
ower and control and not toward creating an open and compet-
tive financial system. The second instrument we use is the rule
f law used by Levine et al. (2000). Banks sign a lot of contracts,
nd a country having a tradition of establishing law and order is
ikely to boost its financial sector development. Both ethnic ten-
ions and rule of law range from zero to six points according to
he International Country Risk Guide database. Ethnic tensions
easure the degree of tension within a country attributable to
4 Ethnic tensions differs from ethnic heterogeneity in that the former takes into
ccount actual events and disturbances within the country arising from ethnic
eterogeneity.
p
H
e
o
a
T
ate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations
statistics for details).
acial, nationality, or language divisions. Lower ratings imply
igh tensions, while higher ratings are given to countries where
ensions are minimal. Higher values for the rule of law vari-
ble denote a greater adherence to law and order. In addition to
hese two instruments, we also include the first and second lags
f financial development indicator as instruments. Singh et al.
2011) use the first and second lags of money and quasi money
easured as (M2)/GDP and domestic credit/GDP, respectively,
hen analyzing the determinants and macroeconomic effects of
emittances.
To gauge the validity of the aforementioned instruments,
e run the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.
nder the null hypothesis, the instruments are valid. We will also
nclude these six instruments in the regression model and esti-
ate by OLS. If the instruments are valid, then their coefficient
stimates should be zero.
.  Results
We begin with the fixed-effects results without using instru-
ents. The results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) reports
he results with bank credit only, column (2) with MFI credit
nly, and column (3) with both variables included in the same
odel. Controlling for per capita income and the Gini index
hat are negatively significant as expected, the results indicate
ank credit reduces poverty as far as the poverty headcount and
overty gap are concerned. As for the squared poverty gap, we
o not see any significant effect of bank credit. MFI credit, on
he other hand, does not appear to have significant effects on
overty reduction regardless of what poverty measure is used.
owever, given the potential for financial development to be
ndogenous, these OLS estimates may be biased.
Table 5 reports the fixed-effects 2SLS results when using rulef law, ethnic tensions, and the first two lags of both bank credit
nd MFI credit to instrument for bank credit and MFI credit.
he results in Table 5 indicate that bank credit reduces poverty
s measured by the headcount or the poverty gap. The use of
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Table 5
2SLS estimates of the effects of financial development (measured by private credit/GDP) on poverty.
Poverty headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Per capita GDP −2.052*** −2.842*** −2.265*** −2.327*** −2.971*** −2.547*** −0.987 −1.410** −1.155*
(−4.13) (−5.03) (−3.94) (−5.07) (−5.68) (−4.81) (−1.60) (−2.10) (−1.68)
Gini index 3.398*** 3.809*** 3.472*** 4.112*** 4.508*** 4.193*** 3.74*** 3.966*** 3.860***
(4.04) (4.41) (4.07) (5.19) (5.56) (5.22) (4.18) (4.30) (4.16)
Credit bank(1) −0.648*** – −0.685*** −0.552*** – −0.585*** −0.256 – −0.312
(−3.30) (−3.31) (−2.88) (−2.91) (−1.08) (−1.13)
Credit MFI(2) – −0.003 0.053 – 0.007 0.054 – 0.019 0.075
(−0.05) (0.73) (0.10) (0.80) (0.14) (0.51)
Constant 8.775 12.038* 10.559* 7.014 9.360 8.806 −4.648 −2.558 −3.341
(1.51) (1.87) (1.67) (1.29) (1.56) (1.49) (−0.68) (−0.35) (−0.46)
Within R2 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.26 0.25
# of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 57
# of obs. 214 214 214 206 206 206 185 185 185
Sargan–Hansen p-value 0.178 0.703 0.271 0.061 0.721 0.177 0.386 0.623 0.503
Note: All variables are expressed in logs. The estimation is based on the fixed-effects 2SLS method for which we report the within R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses
are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations
is reduced in the table because of missing values for poverty variables (see summary statistics for details). The sample is further reduced because ICRG does not
report data for some countries like Benin, Cambodia, Nepal, etc. (1) Credit bank is instrumented using Rule of law, Ethnic tensions, 1st and 2nd lags of credit bank,
Per capita GDP, and Gini index as instruments. (2) Credit MFI is instrumented using Rule of law, Ethnic tensions, 1st and 2nd lags of credit MFI, Per capita GDP,
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atural logarithms for both poverty and bank credit implies that
he coefficient on bank credit can be interpreted as an elasticity.
or the headcount index, a 10% increase in bank credit reduces
overty by about 6.5–6.9%, whereas the same 10% increase in
ank credit reduces poverty by 5.5–5.9% as measured by the
overty gap. For the former, this means that a 10% increase in
ank credit reduces the fraction of the population living on less
han $1.25 a day by about 6.7%. For the latter, the difference in
ncome between the $1.25 per person threshold and the actual
ncome of the poor diminishes by roughly 5.7%.
Compared to the OLS estimates, the IV elasticities are sta-
istically stronger (1% significance versus 5% and 10% for the
LS estimates) and larger in magnitude. Just like the OLS esti-
ates, the coefficients from the IV estimation are not significant
hen considering the squared poverty gap although the sign
oes from positive to negative. As for MFI credit, the IV results
onfirm those from Table 4 in that MFI credit does not have any
ignificant effect on poverty reduction. Per capita income and
ini coefficient have the expected signs as in Ravallion (1997)
nd Adams and Page (2005). More importantly, the magnitudes
f their elasticities are consistent with those in Ravallion (1997)
nd Adams and Page (2005). Only for the squared poverty gap
s income per capita not statistically significant when the model
ncludes bank credit only as its measure of financial develop-
ent.
On the validity of the instruments, the overidentification tests
enerally indicate that the instruments are valid. We observe,
owever, a rejection at the 10% significance level when regress-
ng the poverty gap on the measure of bank credit by itself. As
his may cast some doubt on how valid our instruments are, we
ake a step further and regress the three poverty measures on the
roposed instruments. The results reported in Table 6 indicate
hat only the first lag of bank credit is significantly associated
i
T
hith the squared poverty gap. In theory, this instrument should
e dropped. However, we keep it in the instrument list when
onsidering the squared poverty gap because the results – not
eported here but available upon request – do not qualitatively
hange when excluding the first lag of bank credit from the
nstrument list.
To sum up, our results indicate that bank credit reduces
overty when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio
nd poverty gap. These results support those from Honohan
2004), Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005), Beck et al. (2007),
eanneney and Kpodar (2011), and Sehrawat and Giri (2015),
ho also find that financial development lowers poverty. How-
ver, these conclusions are tempered in that we find no significant
ffect when using the squared poverty gap to measure poverty.
FI credit, on the other hand, does not appear to have any
mpact on poverty regardless of the measure we consider,
uggesting that any effect upon poverty reduction is at most
mall. We are not the first to be skeptical of the ability of
FIs to lower poverty as Chowdhury (2009) raises similar
oubts.
From our results, one can thus wonder how banks show
overty reduction effects (at least as shown by the headcount
nd poverty gap measures) whereas MFIs do not, especially
ince MFIs focus upon helping the poor. One possible way to
xplain the effect of bank credit on poverty is through invest-
ents in infrastructure. In fact, many developing countries still
ave a lot of room for improvements in infrastructure and such
rojects could create various spillovers. A construction com-
any, for instance, may seek funding from banks to build roads.
his road construction will require the hiring of many people,ncluding the poor, which will lead to a decrease in poverty.
here could be also an indirect effect on poverty reduction as
ighlighted by Gachassin et al. (2010) in that access to roads will
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Table 6
OLS estimates of the effects of instruments on poverty.
Poverty headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Per capita GDP −2.194*** −2.691*** −2.360*** −2.431*** −2.961*** −2.757*** −0.965 −1.526** −1.168
(−4.97) (−4.90) (−4.61) (−4.53) (−4.49) (−4.19) (−1.32) (−2.08) (−1.44)
Gini index 3.490*** 3.636*** 3.516*** 4.149*** 4.467*** 4.298*** 3.699*** 3.856*** 3.774***
(2.74) (2.98) (2.65) (3.31) (3.55) (3.23) (3.40) (3.44) (3.42)
Rule of law 0.323 0.289 0.328 0.264 0.187 0.253 0.429 0.442 0.402
(1.37) (1.12) (1.42) (0.82) (0.68) (0.87) (1.17) (1.23) (1.04)
Ethnic tensions 0.075 0.162 0.106 0.224 0.334 0.250 0.292 0.214 0.293
(0.38) (0.62) (0.52) (0.99) (1.16) (1.06) (0.90) (0.60) (0.90)
1st lag credit bank −0.119 – −0.139 0.059 – 0.056 −0.887* – −0.923**
(−0.31) (−0.37) (0.16) (0.15) (−1.94) (−2.09)
2nd lag credit bank −0.608 – −0.613 −0.739 – −0.791 0.758 – 0.735
(−1.21) (−1.18) (−1.35) (−1.42) (1.30) (1.27)
1st lag credit MFI – 0.035 0.054 – 0.014 0.032 – −0.035 0.019
(0.62) (1.36) (0.21) (0.71) (−0.34) (0.17)
2nd lag credit MFI – −0.059 −0.019 – −0.001 0.032 – 0.053 0.038
(−1.07) (−0.40) (−0.03) (0.74) (0.79) (0.55)
Constant 9.420 10.807 10.862 7.561 8.821 10.099 −5.859 −1.849 −4.058
(1.37) (1.74) (1.55) (0.99) (0.248) (1.23) (−0.74) (−0.22) (−0.46)
Within R2 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.28 0.27 0.29
# of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 57
# of obs. 214 214 214 206 206 206 185 185 185
Note: All variables are expressed in logs. The estimation is based on the fixed-effects method for which we report the within R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses
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s reduced in the table because of missing values (see summary statistics for de
acilitate market access by reducing transportation costs. More-
ver, roads can shorten distances to feeder roads and increase
abor productivity in agriculture as shown in Uganda by Fan
nd Zhang (2008). It is obvious that large companies, and to a
esser extent medium companies, will not go to microfinance
nstitutions to seek funding given the size of MFIs’ portfolio.
A second possible explanation as to why traditional banks
ould be more successful in eliminating poverty is that some
anks facing competition from MFIs have also expanded lend-
ng to the poor. In fact, some banks offer microcredit services,
nd some small scale businesses may find bank loans cheaper as
FIs are believed to charge on average higher interest rates.
hanvi (2010) finds that an MFI in India charges twice the
ffective rate charged by banks. Finally, from the supply side,
olden and Prokopenko (2001) argue that the quality of the
oan portfolio of MFIs is sometimes poor because of inadequate
anagement and deficiencies in control of their activities. As a
onsequence, it is difficult for MFIs to reach efficiency levels
o cover their costs. As for the demand side, Chowdhury (2009)
oints out that borrowers may be lacking business skills and
arketing information for loans to expand businesses and cre-
te jobs. Borrowers possessing these skills might then be more
uccessful at obtaining financing from traditional banks.
A final reason is the much greater size of banks. As shown
n Table 1, bank credit and assets are many times larger than
hat of microfinance institutions, providing much greater poten-
ial for their changes in lending to affect the poor. Moreover,
ending from MFIs is almost always “small”, implying that any
ffects could be contained locally and so not impact poverty at
he country level.
A
c
pte significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations
.  Robustness  check
In this section, we check how robust our results are by using an
lternative measure of financial development, namely assets as a
ercentage of GDP. This variable is also popular among financial
evelopment indicators in the literature (see for instance, Beck
t al., 2013). As mentioned earlier, the assets to GDP variable
as the advantage to include credit to the public sector, con-
rary to credit to GDP, which only includes credit to the private
ector by banks and other financial intermediaries. For conve-
ience, we skip the OLS estimates to focus on the IV estimates.
able 7 reports the fixed-effects 2SLS estimates when financial
evelopment is measured by the assets to GDP ratio.
The results are qualitatively similar to those of credit in
able 5. However, the magnitudes of the elasticities are higher.
n increase in bank assets by 10% reduces the proportion of
eople living on less than $1.25 a day by about 8% (7.8–8.4%).
ikewise, the same increase of 10% in bank assets induces about
n 8% (7.6–8.4%) decline in the amount of income separating
hose in poverty from the $1.25 threshold. As before, estimates
re not significant when using the squared poverty gap. Turning
o microfinance, MFI assets do not appear to have any impact
n any of the three measures of poverty. As before, income per
apita and the Gini coefficient have the expected signs and are
tatistically significant. Also, it is important to highlight that
n all regressions, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of over-
dentifying restrictions at conventional levels of significance.
ll together, these results do not systematically differ from the
redit results in the previous section, although the elasticities of
overty with respect to bank assets appear to be a bit larger.
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Table 7
2SLS estimates of the effects of financial development (measured by assets/GDP) on poverty.
Poverty headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Per capita GDP −2.211*** −2.699*** −2.515*** −2.437*** −2.921*** −2.826*** −1.312** −1.515* −1.653*
(−4.36) (−4.26) (−3.77) (−3.27) (−5.01) (−4.68) (−2.08) (−1.86) (−1.87)
Gini index 3.111*** 3.758*** 3.161*** 3.719*** 4.487*** 3.798*** 3.33*** 4.009*** 3.421***
(3.54) (4.33) (3.55) (4.53) (5.49) (4.56) (3.56) (4.28) (3.57)
Assets bank(1) −0.778*** – −0.839*** −0.762*** – −0.835*** −0.295 – −0.383
(−3.30) (−3.30) (−3.27) (−3.32) (−1.08) (−1.13)
Assets MFI(2) – −0.026 0.055 – −0.003 0.070 – 0.035 0.086
(−0.35) (0.71) (−0.05) (0.99) (0.27) (0.53)
Constant 11.839* 10.968 14.568** 10.290* 8.989 13.695** −0.095 −1.799 2.908
(1.95) (1.62) (2.01) (1.82) (1.43) (2.05) (−0.01) (−0.23) (0.32)
Within R2 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.25 0.25
# of countries 57 58 57 57 58 57 56 57 56
# of obs. 210 214 210 202 206 202 181 185 181
Sargan–Hansen p-value 0.478 0.438 0.651 0.296 0.712 0.315 0.147 0.691 0.221
Note: All variables are expressed in logs. The estimation is based on the fixed-effects 2SLS method for which we report the within R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses
are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations
is reduced in the table because of missing values for poverty variables (see summary statistics for details). The sample is further reduced because ICRG does not
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Aeport data for some countries like Benin, Cambodia, Nepal, etc. (1) Assets ban
er capita GDP, and Gini index as instruments. (2) Assets MFI is instrumented
nd Gini index as instruments.
.  Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between financial devel-
pment as measured by the size of either traditional banks
r MFIs and poverty reduction. Specifically, we compare the
xtent to which each one of these financial institutions con-
ributes to alleviate poverty. To that effect, we employ a poverty
odel developed by Ravallion (1997) that regresses poverty on
ncome per capita and the Gini index, in which we include finan-
ial development indicators. Applying the fixed-effects 2SLS
echnique to a panel of 71 developing countries from 2002 to
011, our results indicate that bank loans have poverty reduc-
ion effects when poverty is measured by poverty headcount and
overty gap. When poverty is measured by squared poverty gap,
ank loans do not have significant impacts. MFI loans, on the
ther hand, do not appear to significantly reduce poverty across
ll the three measures of poverty. These results are robust when
nancial development is measured by bank assets or MFI assets
s a percentage of GDP. More importantly, banks’ impact on
overty is higher. Our results suggest that banking development
an help combat extreme poverty, but may fail to reach the poo-
est, while microfinance development is still at infant stage and
as certainly a long way to go to alleviate poverty. Many studies
ave reported poverty reduction effects of MFIs at the micro
evel, but these effects are yet to appear at the aggregate level.
A few studies have reported that financial development
educes poverty (Honohan, 2004; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005;
eck et al., 2007; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Sehrawat and
iri, 2015), and our bank results are consistent with the liter-
ture, at least when poverty is measured by poverty headcount
nd poverty gap. In the model of Greenwood and Jovanovic
1990), there is a fee the poor need to pay to participate in the
ormal financial market. Failing to pay this fee excludes the poor
rom taking advantage of opportunities in the financial sector. A
A
Bstrumented using Rule of law, Ethnic tensions, 1st and 2nd lags of assets bank,
 Rule of law, Ethnic tensions, 1st and 2nd lags of assets MFI, Per capita GDP,
ossible policy recommendation is to lower such fees in order to
llow more people to take advantage of financial opportunities
hat banks can provide. Such fees could be a cause of a market
ailure, which according to Stiglitz (1993) is the fundamental
ause of poverty in developing countries.
The microfinance results seem to be consistent with
howdhury (2009), who casts doubt on the effectiveness of
icrofinance as a means to alleviate poverty. Even if theo-
ies (Buera et al., 2012) and evidence (Donou-Adonsou, 2014;
onou-Adonsou and Sylwester, 2015) suggest that MFIs have
acroeconomic effects such as growth effect, our study clearly
mplies that the so-called trickle-down effect in the financial
evelopment literature may not work for MFIs as it does for
anks. We do not suggest that the international community
hould not support MFIs, but our results do suggest that even if
hey are beneficial, MFIs are not panaceas for reducing poverty.
We urge further work in this area to better understand find-
ngs. The data only extend back to 2002, preventing use of a
ong time series. Perhaps our sample period is not long enough
o adequately measure the effect of MFIs on poverty. As stated
reviously, due to data availability our measures of the size of
FIs rely upon the characteristics of the borrower. Ideally, one
ould like to examine to what extent results would change if
FIs were defined based on the characteristics of the lender.
inally, we consider the potential for banks and MFIs to have
ountrywide effects, but macro effects could arise at regional
i.e. provincial levels) even if they are not countrywide. These
imitations warrant continued study of this issue.
ppendix.The countries in the sample include: Albania, Armenia,
zerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
urundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo
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